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January 22, 2026 2 min read Fateh Mohammed

Multi-Agent Architecture for Security Analysis

Why a single monolithic scanner cannot match specialized detectors working together. A look at multi-agent security analysis design.

EngineeringArchitectureProduct

Security scanning is not one problem. It is a collection of specialized problems that share a pipeline. Secret detection, injection analysis, XSS pattern matching, and access control review each require different detection strategies, different context, and different expertise.

The monolithic scanner problem

Traditional security scanners use a single analysis engine that tries to find everything. This approach has fundamental limitations:

  • Rule conflicts. Detection rules for different vulnerability classes can interfere with each other.
  • Performance bottlenecks. A slow detector blocks the entire pipeline.
  • Maintenance overhead. Updating one detector risks breaking others.
  • Expertise dilution. General-purpose rules are less accurate than specialized ones.

The multi-agent approach

A multi-agent architecture runs specialized detectors in parallel, each optimized for a specific vulnerability class.

PR Diff
  ├── Secrets Hound      → credential patterns, entropy analysis
  ├── Injection Sniper   → SQL, command, path traversal
  ├── XSS Patterns       → DOM sinks, unsafe rendering
  └── Permission Sentinel → auth middleware, tenant scoping

Each agent:

  • Owns its domain. It only detects what it is designed to detect.
  • Runs independently. Failures in one agent do not affect others.
  • Has specialized tuning. Thresholds and heuristics are optimized per vulnerability class.

Aggregation and normalization

After agents run, a normalization layer:

  1. Converts findings into a common schema.
  2. Deduplicates overlapping results.
  3. Assigns severity using a consistent scoring model.
  4. Evaluates findings against the repository's policy configuration.

This produces a unified result set that is consistent regardless of how many agents contributed.

Practical benefits

  • Faster iteration. Updating the secret detector does not require retesting injection detection.
  • Better accuracy. Each agent can use the optimal detection strategy for its domain.
  • Parallel execution. Total scan time is limited by the slowest agent, not the sum of all agents.
  • Gradual expansion. New vulnerability classes can be added as new agents without modifying existing ones.

Specialization at the detection layer and standardization at the reporting layer gives teams the best of both approaches.